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Abstract
Launching and stimulating competition in telecommunications markets is an
important policy goal. It contains two elements: to encourage entry and to
make competition effective such that consumers benefit. The first one
requires that entrants can make profits after investing in infrastructure so that
they have an incentive to invest. The second one requires prices to be
sufficiently low so that consumers enjoy higher net utilities. At a first glance,
these two elements seem difficult to achieve at the same time. In this paper,
we consider price regulation in the retail and wholesale market and answer
to what extent such regulatory policy can stimulate competition. Our main
finding is that, in the short run, asymmetric access price regulation is an
effective instrument to make the entrant and consumers better off.
JEL Classification: L96, L51, L13.
Paul de Bijl
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic
Policy Analysis
P.O.Box 80510
2508 GM The Hague
The Netherlands
Martin Peitz







It has become conventional wisdom that competition in telecommunications
(possibly subject to regulation) serves welfare and consumers better than the
former state monopoly, both from a static as well as from a dynamic per-
spective. The British regulating authority Oftel states: “Competition is the
means to best protect consumers interests. Competitive markets with incen-
tives to innovate are fundamental to meeting consumer needs. Regulation
must not undermine such incentives but instead should be directed towards
achieving e¤ective competition and, as necessary, protecting consumers be-
fore it is achieved or where there is a need for additional protection.” (Oftel,
2000, 1.2–1.4). Regulation (shortly after liberalization) can thus be seen as a
means to promote competition in the short and the longer run. It promotes
competition in the short run if, for given entry, the pressure on prices is in-
creased; it promotes competition in the long run if entry into the market is
facilitated.
Shortly after liberalization, the regulator possibly has to intervene to
avoid the exploitation of the consumers by the former state monopolist who
still enjoys a dominant position. Such regulation must bear in mind that the
incentives to enter and invest in infrastructure must not be undermined by
such regulation. Ideally, regulatory pricing policy is designed such that it
fosters competition and makes consumers better o¤.
Competition in asymmetric markets – and this is what “new” competition
implies – and regulatory policy in such markets is the topic of this paper.
Asymmetric market environments may ask for asymmetric regulation. In the
policy debate the desirability of asymmetric regulation has been recognized
(see, for instance, European Commission, 2000, and Oftel, 2000). Recent
market liberalization in Europe has allowed new competitors into the market,
some of which are busy to build up their own networks. Central to the success
of an entrant is its access to the end users. If entrants are to build their own
consumer base they have to build up their own access network (local loop) or
have to engage in unbundling agreements with the owner of the local loop.
In the former case one speaks of facilities-based competition, in the latter of
local loop unbundling.
In this paper we present a simple model of competition in telecommunica-
tions market in which entrants have already made the necessary investments
(or contractual arrangements) to compete in a particular telecommunications
market. An entrant operator has access to consumers either by its own fa-
cilities or through local loop unbundling. Hence, we consider a situation of
two-way interconnection. Our main question is: How should one design regu-
lation with the purpose of stimulating competition, ensuring that consumers
1bene…t from entry and operators have su¢cient interests to be active in the
market?
Di¤erent from most of the literature, our focus is on asymmetric initial
market conditions and asymmetric regulation. The literature on the eco-
nomic theory of two-way interconnection has been initiated by the papers of
Armstrong (1998), La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998), and Carter and Wright
(1999). This work and follow-ups have been reviewed by La¤ont and Tirole
(2000) and Armstrong (2001); see also De Bijl and Peitz (2000). In De Bijl
and Peitz (2000, 2001) and Peitz (2001), we develop models that allow us
to address some of the asymmetries that have received little attention in the
existing theoretical literature.1 We draw heavily on this earlier work. In this
paper our focus is on policy relevant conclusions that emerge from access
price regulation in an evolving industry.
In our market, the entrant initially lacks a track record of quality whereas
the incumbent already has such a track record. This captures the reliability
of the networks and the reputation for quality. Given that the entrant is
active, its track record improves exogenously over time and the asymmetry
between the operators becomes smaller as the entrant gains experience and
reputation. Operators compete in two-part tari¤s, that is, they set a price
per call minute and a monthly subscription fee. In the present paper we
present and discuss some of the results within a particularly simple setting.
Also, we start from a benchmark model of regulated per-minute retail prices
which serves as a benchmark. We solve this model analytically (see Peitz,
2001).
T h em a i ni n s i g h to ft h ec u r r e n tp a p e ri st h a ta s y m m e t r i ca c c e s sp r i c e
regulation is a powerful policy instrument that bene…ts the entrant and con-
sumers.2 This provides a policy recommendation for the regulation of the
wholesale market.
To the extent that wholesale price regulation on its own still leaves room
for the former state monopolist to exploit consumers, regulation of retail
prices may be desirable: since the incumbent initially enjoys substantial
market power, a price cap regime in the retail market may be needed in
addition to asymmetric access regulation in order to protect consumers from
excessive retail prices. Binding price caps on the incumbent’s subscription
fee make, however, the incumbent operator more aggressive, which possibly
reduces or eliminates the incentives for an entrant to undertake the necessary
investments to compete in the market. Hence, such retail price regulation
1There does not exist a consensus in the literature whether regulation should be allowed
to be asymmetric or not (see Perrucci and Cimatoribus, 1997).
2This insight is also obtained in De Bijl and Peitz, 2001, and Peitz, 2001. In the current
paper, we combine analytical and simulation work in a particularly simple model.
2has to be applied very carefully.
Section 2 presents the model, the solution procedure, and a short discus-
sion of the …rst-best outcome (including a discussion of the costs and bene…ts
of liberalization). Based on Peitz (2001), section 3 analyzes the model under
the restriction that per-minute prices are …xed equal to true marginal costs
so that operators only compete in subscription fees. This modes is solved
analytically and serves as a benchmark. Based on De Bijl and Peitz (2001),
section 4 analyzes the model in which pricing in the retail market is not re-
stricted. It also considers price cap regulation in the retail market: namely,
the regulator may wish to impose a (temporary) price cap on the incumbent’s
subscription fee. Section 5 provides a discussion of results and a discussion
of related policy questions.
2 A Model of Facility-Based Entry
We consider two operators, an incumbent (operator 1) and an entrant (op-
erator 2). The model is a simpli…ed version of the model used in De Bijl and
Peitz (2001).
Assume that the two networks have a full-coverage network. This is a nat-
ural starting point when analyzing …xed telephony. The networks consist of a
long-distance backbone, a local access network, and switches. In each period
t =1 ;:::;T,e a c ho p e r a t o ri chooses a per-minute price pt
i and a subscription
fee mt
i. The market shares resulting from competition and consumers’ choices
are denoted by st
1 = s1[p1;p 2;m 1;m 2;t] and st
2 = s2[p1;p 2;m 1;m 2;t].
2.1 Consumer Demand
The consumer side consists of consumers with mass n who all are subscribed
to either one network. To avoid head-to-head competition á la Bertrand, we
assume that networks are horizontally di¤erentiated. Consumers are assumed
to be uniformly distributed on the [0;1]-interval. Operator 1 is located at
l1 =0 , and operator 2 at l2 =1 .C o n s u m e r z 2 [0;1] incurs a disutility
¡µjli ¡ zj, which is linear in the distance between consumer location and
the location of the operator. The parameter µ expresses the substitutability
between networks: if µ =0networks are perfect substitutes; the larger µ the
more di¤erentiated networks are.3
Each consumer subscribes to exactly one operator. The consumer who
is identi…ed by its location z subscribes to operator 1 if v1[p1;m 1;t] ¡ µz >
3This is the Hotelling speci…cation that has also been used in the seminal papers by
Armstrong (1998) and La¤ont, Rey, Tirole (1998).
3v2[p2;m 2;t]¡µ(1¡z);where vi[pi;m i;t] denotes the conditional indirect utility










i;t] ¡ vj[pj;m j;t]
2µ
:
An operator’s market share increases if the operator o¤ers a relatively larger
level of net utility to consumers, and decreases otherwise. One can observe
that larger values of µ make it more di¢cult to gain market share.
Conditional indirect utility for a network at an ideal location takes the
following form:
vi[pi;m i;t]=Ui[t] ¡ mi + u[x[pi]] ¡ pix[pi]:
This indirect utility consists of a tra¢c-independent part and a tra¢c-dependent
part. Clearly, net utility is decreasing in prices. We implicitly assume that
net utility of each network is positive for all consumers, that is, vi ¡ µ>0.
First, consider the tra¢c-dependent part. Given a price per-minute equal
to pi, each consumer has an individual demand of x[pi] call minutes, and
derives utility u[x] from calling x minutes.4
Second, consider the tra¢c-independent part. Here, the consumer has
to pay the subscription fee mi. A consumer derives a …xed (and possibly
operator-speci…c and time-dependent) utility from subscribing to network i,
Ui[t], which is independent of the number of telephone calls that are made.5
We postulate that the …xed utility can be written as u0
i(1 ¡ qi[t]).T h e
di¤erent terms are understood as follows: the …rst term u0
i is an individual
e¤ect, which are long-run …xed utilities. In our analysis we assume that
networks are symmetric in the long run so that u0
1 = u0
2 = u0.T h e s e c o n d
term qi[t]u0
i re‡ects the disutility due to the (partial) lack of track record
of network i, qi[t],w h e r e1 ¸ qi[t] ¸ 0 and limt!1 qi[t]=0 . With respect
to this track record we postulate that there exists an asymmetry between
the incumbent and the entrant: an entrant has to build up the reliability of
its network and the reputation for quality. Hence, in early periods we have
q2[t] >q 1[t]. In particular, in our simulation we assume that the incumbent
does not su¤er from such an initial lack of a track record so that q1[t]=0
for all t. Depending on the reliability and reputation of the former state
monopolist, this assumption can be modi…ed.
4Since individual demand of a subscriber to operator i is de…ned by x[pi]=
argmaxxfu[x] ¡ xp ig, individual demand is derived by solving the …rst-order condition
for utility maximization u0[x]=p.
5Asymmetries on the demand side have been introduced by Carter and Wright (1999,
2001) and De Bijl and Peitz (2000, 2001). Note that we do not allow utility to depend on
the number of received calls. On this see Jeon, La¤ont and Tirole (2001).
4The track record captures utility di¤erences between operators stemming
from quality di¤erences which may exogenously vanish over time. Entrants
may be quick to roll out networks to o¤er voice telephony and gain market
share, but initially, their networks may not satisfy the same quality standards
as the incumbent’s network.6 The track record also captures the utility
derived from availability and quality of services that are additional to basic
telephony (e.g. wake-up calls, information services, voice mail) that may
be added by the entrant over time. An alternative speci…cation in which
previous market share enters is provided by De Bijl and Peitz (2001) (see
also De Bijl and Peitz, 2000).
Example: one concrete speci…cation of demand and utility functions would
be the following: u[x]=ax ¡ 1
2bx2 (a;b > 0) so that x[pi]=( a ¡ pi)=b and
vi[pi;m i;t]=Ui[t]+1
2(pi¡a)2=b¡mi. For the purpose of illustration, utility
is assumed to increase linearly with the track record of the new …rm up to
some period t¤.W e w r i t e q2[t]=1¡ minft ¡ 1;(t¤ ¡ 1)g=(t¤ ¡ 1).T h i si s
also the speci…cation that will be used in the simulations.7
2.2 Costs, Tra¢c Volume, and Pro…t Functions
Following the theory on competition in telecommunications (e.g. La¤ont
and Tirole, 2000) we distinguish between three di¤erent types of costs: …xed
costs that are independent of tra¢c and the number of consumers served,
connection-dependent but tra¢c-independent “…xed”costs, and tra¢c-dependent
costs.
The …rst type of costs, Ci, is independent of the number of connections.
Such costs may be incurred initially, for instance, the costs of building a
backbone, and are possibly sunk when pricing decisions are taken.
The second type of costs is connection-dependent but tra¢c-independent:
the per-period and per-connection …xed cost of the local access network,
which will also be denoted as the …xed cost of the local loop. This cost
captures, for instance, the maintenance cost of the local loop, and may also
include the investment cost that has to be recovered. Operator i’s …xedcost of
the local loop is denoted by fi. Connection-dependent but tra¢c independent
costs a¤ect the gain per consumer and therefore operators’ pricing decisions.
6For the sake of simplicity, we did not make endogenous the decisions such as to what
extent to upgrade a cable network. We purely focus on pricing decisions and see our
speci…cation as an interesting starting point because some asymmetries between networks
are likely to persist in the medium term independent of the decisions of the new operators.
7We specify demand as linear. This can be seen as the linear approximation of a
nonlinear demand function. For this it would be important to have a good estimate of the
slope of the demand curve in the neighborhood of the realized equilibrium.
5The third type of costs are tra¢c-dependent. Marginal costs of telephony
are close to zero, if one strictly applies the de…nition of marginal costs. In
reality, operators typically impute …xed costs to telephony tra¢c, enabling
them to de…ne a reference point for prices (although these costs do not di-
rectly depend on tra¢c). We follow this latter understanding of costs and
de…ne “marginal costs” as the costs that a sales/marketing department at-
tributes to tra¢c when making pricing decisions.8
Costs which are also perceived as tra¢c-dependent costs are charges for
interconnection and access. These charges are typically incurred on a per-
minute basis. Total tra¢c-dependent costs therefore include an operator’s
marginal cost, as de…ned in the previous paragraph, and charges paid to
other operators for interconnection and access. Let cik denote operator i’s
tra¢c-dependent cost per-minute associated with a telephone call of type k,
as explained below. We will follow the convention in the literature, where it
is typically assumed that the marginal cost of the local loop is the same for
originating and terminating tra¢c:
ci1 ¡ ci2 = ci3:
In the case of o¤-net calls and incoming calls, the operator of the network
where the call originates pays a per-minute terminating access fee to the
operator of the network where the call terminates. Period-t terminating
access prices paid to operator i are denoted by ¿t
i. Access prices are reciprocal
in period t if ¿t
1 = ¿t
2 and non-reciprocal or asymmetric otherwise. We
distinguish three types of telephone calls:
² on-net calls: calls that originate and terminate on a single operator’s
network (k =1 ) with associated costs ci1 for operator i;
² o¤-net calls: calls that terminate on another operator’s network (k =
2) with associated costs ci2 + ¿t
j for operator i;
² incoming calls: calls that originate from another operator’s network
(k =3 ) with associated costs ci3 ¡ ¿t
i for operator i.
To derive pro…t functions, we have to specify consumers’ calling patterns.
We assume that when a consumer makes a telephone call, the receiver of
the call can be any other consumer with equal probability, independent of
8This should be kept in mind when making welfare comparisons: per-minute prices
equal to these marginal costs may not be welfare-maximizing because in the …rst
best per-minute prices are equal to true marginal costs (below we abstract from such
considerations).
6the network she is subscribed to. In the aggregate, the shares of on-net and
o¤-net calls of an operator are equal to its and its competitor’s market share,
respectively.9
Pro…ts are generated from di¤erent sources. The expressions for these
terms of the pro…t function are easily expressed (see Table 1).
source operator 1 operator 2
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Table 1: Net revenues
Operator i’s period-t pro…ts, denoted by ¼i, are the sum of pro…ts from on-
net tra¢c, pro…ts from o¤-net calls, pro…ts from incoming tra¢c and pro…ts
from subscription minus …xed costs that are independent of the number of
subscribers. Pro…t functions depend of both operators’ prices, which re‡ects
that the operators strategically interact with each other. Fixed costs not
attributed to tra¢c or connection, although they clearly a¤ect pro…ts, do
not in‡uence pricing decisions.
2.3 Equilibrium
To conclude the description of the model, we recapitulate the structure of
the game. Operators take terminating access prices ¿t
1 and ¿t
2 in each pe-
riod as given. They simultaneously choose per-minute prices pt
1 and pt
2,a n d
(monthly) subscription fees mt
1 and mt
2. Consumers observe these prices,
choose where to subscribe and make their telephone calls in period t.O p -
erators receive pro…ts ¼1[p1;p 2;m 1;m 2;t] and ¼2[p1;p 2;m 1;m 2;t] in period
t.
Operators maximize period pro…ts while taking the prices chosen by its
rival …rm as given. Equilibrium values of functions and variables will be
marked with superscript ¤. For example, in an equilibrium in period t,o p -
erator 1’s per-minute price is denoted by pt¤
1 . A Nash equilibrium in period




2 ), satis…es the following
conditions:
9For instance, given prices and realized market shares, the total volume of call minutes
that originates on network 1 is equal to ns 1x[p1].T h e n a f r a c t i o n s1 of this volume,
that is, ns 1s1x[p1], terminates on network 1. Similarly, the tra¢c volume terminating on
network 2 is ns 2s1x[p1].
71. Each operator’s prices pt¤
i and mt¤
i maximize its pro…ts given the other
operator’s prices pt¤
j and mt¤
j ,f o ri =1 ;2,w h e r ei 6= j.
2. Consumers choose a network and a quantity of call minutes to maximize
net utility, and the operators take this behavior into account while
choosing prices.
In an equilibrium in period t, none of the operators has an incentive to





























for all admissible p1;p 2;m 1;m 2. In our simulations we check that the solu-
tions to the system of …rst-order conditions, (pt¤
i ;m t¤
i ), are a global maximizer
of ¼i[¢;¢;p t¤
j ;m t¤
j ;t]. For details see De Bijl and Peitz (2001).
We consider a sequence of Nash equilibria for periods t =1 ;:::;T.T h i s
sequence generates the same outcome as the subgame-perfect equilibrium of
the game which encompasses all T p e r i o d sa sd i ¤ e r e n ts t a g e s .
2.4 Surplus and Welfare
The market outcome and the impact of regulation can be evaluated by assess-
ing consumers surplus, pro…ts and market share of each operator, and welfare.
It is possibly important to consider not only welfare but also consumers sur-
plus because regulation may decrease the former but increase the latter (and
transfers from producers to consumers may only be achieved through reg-
ulation). A regulator wishing to ensure that consumers bene…t from entry
and competition, may be interested in maximizing consumers surplus under
the constraint that the operators make enough pro…ts to have incentives to
invest in infrastructure and quality of service. Alternatively, it may want to
maximize a weighted average of consumer surplus and pro…ts for each …rm.
Producers surplus in period t, PSt, is equal as the sum of pro…ts in the
industry. Consumers surplus in period t, CSt, de…ned as the consumers’
aggregate net utility, is equal to
CS




































The last term in the expression for consumer surplus is the disutility that
consumers incur owing to the subscription to a network that does not possess
ideal characteristics. The welfare level in period t, W t, is equal to the total
surplus that is realized in the market, Wt = PSt + CSt.
82.5 Welfare: The Costs and Bene…ts of Liberalization
Consider two technologically symmetric networks, that is, their cost struc-
tures are identical. In this case, we ask: is a cost-based duopoly superior
to a cost-based monopoly in terms of welfare? Note that …rst-best pricing
involves per-minute prices equal to (true) marginal cost, that is, pi = c11.
Since we assume that all consumers participate in the market, the level of
the subscription fee is arbitrary.10 We can consider subscription fees equal
to the …xed costs of a connection, mi = fi.
In our model, a duopoly leads to the following social costs, compared to
monopoly:
² connection-independent …xed costs, Ct
i, are duplicated,
² the entrant initially lacks a track record of quality.
In our model, a duopoly leads on the other hand to social bene…ts:
² the di¤erentiated duopoly better …ts a consumer population with het-
erogeneous tastes.
Other social bene…ts (that are not incorporated into the model) are those
associated to competition reducing the X-ine¢ciency of the incumbent, i.e.,
socially wasteful expenditures can be avoided. Such expenditures were pos-
sibly included in the pro…ts of the incumbent. Also, mature competition
creates a level-playing …eld, and this possibly reduces the social costs of reg-
ulation, which were not introduced into the model. Last but not least, it is
often claimed that a protected monopoly leads to dynamic ine¢ciencies by
not providing the right incentives to invest.
If …xed costs Ct
i are negligible in the long run duopoly is welfare improv-
ing upon monopoly (at cost-based prices). This is so because in the long
run the entrant will have built up a track record of quality and o¤ers the
same utility vi as the incumbent at prices pt
1 = pt
2, m1 = m2.B e c a u s e o f
the initial lack of a quality track record, the entrant’s network o¤ers lower
…xed utility in early periods. Therefore, a duopoly is welfare improving upon
monopoly in the short run if the better average …t owing to product di¤er-
entiation overcompensates the lower utility associated to the lack of track
record in the short run. Considering intertemporal welfare, if the discount
factor is su¢ciently close to 1 and the time horizon T su¢ciently long, then
10Clearly, for high subscription fees some consumers eventually no longer subscribe so
that the assumption of full participation only makes sense for su¢ciently low subscription
fees.
9a cost-based duopoly dominates a cost-based monopoly in terms of welfare
for su¢ciently low …xed costs Ct
i.
Even if a cost-based duopoly leads to lower welfare in our model, one can
still make the case for competition by referring to unmodelled advantages of
competition such as those mentioned above. Below, we take the decision to
introduce competition as given.11
3A F i r s t A n a l y s i s
The analysis in which per-minute prices are ‡exible is too complex to al-
low us to obtain analytical expressions for prices, market share and pro…ts.
Therefore, we present in this section a simple model in which per-minute
retail prices are …xed at true marginal cost levels, that is, pi = c1, i =1 ;2.12
Operators are not allowed to adjust per-minute prices to perceived marginal
costs. This implies that under positive access markups both operators will
su¤er from losses for o¤-net tra¢c whereas on-net tra¢c does not contribute
to pro…ts. Pro…t functions can be written as
¼i = nsisjx[c1](c1 ¡ c2 ¡ ¿j)+nsisjx[c1](¿i ¡ c3)+nsi(mi ¡ fi)
= nsi(s2x[c1](¿i ¡ ¿j)+mi ¡ fi):
By looking at the pro…t functions we make the following remark:
Remark 1 In the model with …xed per-minute prices, pro…ts are neutral to
the level of reciprocal access prices. This holds not only if the market is
symmetric but also if it is asymmetric.
In the model with ‡exible per-minute prices pro…t neutrality can be
shown under symmetric competition but not under asymmetric competi-
tion.13 This suggests that our simple model does abstract from an important
element which arises from di¤erences in individual demand due to di¤erent
per-minute prices under asymmetric competition. Nevertheless, we will see
that our simple model is quite useful for the analysis of asymmetric access
price regulation.
11Nevertheless, before the government decides to liberalize a market it is important to
ask whether competition (regulated or not) indeed improves upon a regulated monopoly.
12For a detailed analysis, see Peitz (2001).
13In their simulations De Bijl and Peitz (2000) observe that the larger operator does not
gain from an access price di¤erent from marginal costs. This is formally shown in Carter
and Wright (2001). We also would like to point out that in our simple model a reciprocal
access price cannot be used as a collusive device.
10We obtain a unique equilibrium candidate that solves the …rst-order con-
ditions of pro…ts maximization.14 If asymmetries between networks are suf-
…ciently small then the solution to the …rst-order conditions indeed is an
equilibrium. In particular, we assume that the expression for m¤
i and s¤
i be-
low are positive for both operators (under cost-based access price regulation).
This means that we implicitly assume that networks are not too asymmetric.




















(Ui ¡ Uj)+( fj ¡ fi)
6µ
:
The market share is positive if (Ui ¡ Uj)+( fj ¡ fi)+3 µ>0.W ec a nn o w
make the following remark:
Remark 2 In the model with …xed per-minute prices, in an interior equilib-
rium, market shares are independent of access prices.







2((Ui ¡ Uj)+( fj ¡ fi)+3 µ)
2(2µ +( ¿i ¡ ¿j)x[c1]):
From these expressions we immediately obtain a number of interesting
and intuitive comparative statics results.
Result 1 In the model with …xed per-minute prices
(i) a higher access price of operator i leads to higher pro…ts of operator i
and lower pro…ts of operator j, j 6= i;
(ii) lower …xed costs of the local loop of operator i lead to higher pro…ts
of operator i and lower pro…ts of operator j, j 6= i;
(iii) similarly, a higher …xed utility o¤ered by network i leads to higher
pro…ts of operator i and lower pro…ts of operator j, j 6= i;
(iv) if networks become more di¤erentiated pro…ts of both operators in-
crease.
14Note that “typically” (j¿1 ¡¿2j not too large) best responses are upward sloping and
networks are strategic complements.
15We require that the expression for m¤
i and s¤
i are positive for both operators (under
cost-based access price regulation). This gives restrictions on the asymmetry between
networks.
11Our main question is what regulatory policy should be adopted such that
it satis…es three objectives: a high total surplus (as a measure of welfare), a
high consumer surplus (because competition is supposed to ultimately bene…t
consumers), and high pro…ts of the smaller network (to stimulate entry).
The proposition above tells us that the pro…ts of operator 2 are increased
by setting asymmetric access prices with ¿2 >¿ 1. If we see operator 2 as
the entrant that o¤ers initially a lower brand utility then asymmetric access
price regulation that favors the entrant achieves that the entrant’s pro…ts
are higher than under cost-based access price regulation. This means that
asymmetric access price regulation is a tool to stimulate entry.
Does the goal to stimulate entry con‡ict with the goal to protect con-
sumers? As noted above (see Remark 2) market share is independent of
access prices, which are …xed by the regulator (or arise through cooperative
or non-cooperative choices by the operators). This implies that total wel-
fare is independent of access prices.16 Changes in access prices merely lead
to a redistribution of surplus between operators and consumers. Consumer






Note that consumer surplus depends on the di¤erence of access prices
¹ ´ ¿1 ¡ ¿2. Operators can be asymmetric on the cost side or the demand
side. Suppose that both have the same cost structure and that the only
di¤erence between the two operators is that operator 2 is (initially) less






(U1 ¡ U2) < 0:
Consequently, not only the entrant but also consumers bene…t from access
price regulation that favors the entrant (¿2 >¿ 1).
Result 2 In the model with …xed per-minute prices, asymmetric access price
regulation that favors the weaker operator leads to higher pro…ts of this oper-
ator and to higher consumer surplus while total surplus remains constant.
We can see the unambiguous e¤ect on consumer surplus by looking at
subscription fees (using the fact that market share does not change, see Re-
mark 2). Not only do consumers in the aggregate bene…t but each individual
16To see this, note that access prices above costs do not distort per-minute prices because
the latter are …xed. Since market share remain constant, both costs and gross utilities are
not a¤ected by changes of the access prices.
12consumer bene…ts from asymmetric regulation because subscription fees of
both operators are lower than under reciprocal access price regulation.17
Summarizing, this model provides strong reasons for the regulator to
use asymmetric regulation in markets in which an entrant is initially at a
disadvantage. We will see below that this conclusion remains essentially
valid when operators are free to set per-minute price.
4 New Competition in Telecommunications
Markets
In this section we analyze the model of Section 2 with the help of simulations.
We characterize the evolution of a telecommunications market under a certain
parameter constellation (see the Appendix). In contrast to the previous
section, both operators are unconstrained in their choice of two-part tari¤s.
4.1 Operators’ Retail Prices
Each operator has two instruments, per-minute price and subscription fee,
and can separate the building of market share in terms of subscribers from
the generation of call volume for each subscriber (see, for instance, La¤ont,
Rey, and Tirole, 1998, p. 21). Given any prices of the competitor, pro…t max-










j) in each period t:
In setting its per-minute price, each operator behaves as if it maximizes the
di¤erence between consumer’s surplus and costs that are tra¢c-dependent.
In this respect, it behaves like a monopolist, which uses the subscription fee
to extract consumer surplus and sets the usage price equal to marginal costs.
The reason is that the gain in consumer surplus from a cut in the per-minute
price below perceived marginal costs is less than the associated cost that the
operator incurs, whereas a reduction in the subscription fee translates one-
to-one into greater consumer surplus. Hence, in competing for market share,
the subscription fee is a more e¤ective instrument than per-minute price.
17We see this from equation (1): the incumbent network enjoys a …xed utility advantage
so that all consumers described to this network pay less as ¿2 ¡ ¿1 is increased. Since
the sign of the …xed utility di¤erence and of the access price di¤erence is reversed for
the entrant also all consumers described to the entrant’s network pay less as ¿2 ¡ ¿1 is
increased.











Figure 1: Cost-based regulation: subscription fees
One can show that an operator that sets its per-minute price equal to
perceived marginal costs makes zero pro…ts from the total amount of on-net
and o¤-net tra¢c. Consequently, the only sources of pro…ts are revenues
from subscription and revenues from incoming tra¢c.18 In equilibrium, an
increase in the product di¤erentiation parameter µ has no direct e¤ect on per-
minute prices, while it directly pushes the subscription fees upward (there
are possibly also indirect e¤ects through changes in market shares).
4.2 Cost-Based and Reciprocal Access Price Regula-
tion
In our simulations the …xed utility disadvantage of the entrant decreases
linearly over time up to period t¤, which is set equal to 11 (one period cor-
responds to two months). Subscription fees respond to this …xed utility
di¤erence. For instance, under cost-based regulation, in period 2 the …xed
utility di¤erence is equal to 45 Euros and the di¤erence in subscription fees
i se q u a lt o3 0E u r o s( p e r i o d5 :3 0E u r o sa n d2 0E u r o s ,r e s p e c t i v e l y ;p e r i o d
8: 15 Euros and 10 Euros respectively). The evolution of subscription fees
is depicted in Figure 1. Under cost-based regulation all variables can be ex-
pressed analytically and it is possible to dispose of numerical methods (see
Section 3 for the analytical results with ¿i = c3).
Similar to subscription fees, also market shares evolve linearly over time
until the entrant has fully built up its track record of quality. With our
18Per-minute price equal perceived marginal cost holds in the symmetric setup of La¤ont,
Rey, and Tirole (1998) and asymmetric setups as in this paper or De Bijl and Peitz (2000,
2001). Note the di¤erence to the analysis in the previous section. Nevertheless, results in
the two versions coincide under cost-based access price regulation.











Figure 2: Cost-based regulation: pro…ts
parameter values the entrant …rst gains a market share of around 8.3% which
is augmented by around 4.2% each period.
Under cost-based regulation, none of the operators obtains pro…ts from
incoming calls and pro…ts in equilibrium are ¼t
i = nst
i(mt
i ¡ fi) ¡ Ct
i.H e r e ,
we look at pro…ts gross of …xed costs Ct
i. Since the entrant’s market share
and subscription fee increase linearly over time, pro…ts are increasing and
convex over time until the entrant has caught up with the incumbent. Cor-
respondingly, the incumbent’s pro…ts are decreasing and convex over time
(see Figure 2).
As explained in Section 2, welfare in a mature duopoly dominates wel-
fare under monopoly for Ct
i su¢ciently small because of bene…cial product
di¤erentiation. In initial periods, there is a social cost to duopoly because of
the lack of the entrant’s track record. If those social costs are high, welfare
is possibly higher under a regulatory regime which makes it harder for the
entrant to gain market share in early periods. The trade-o¤ between the
gradual built-up of a track record, which makes the entrant more attractive,
and the gain in market share explains why welfare can be decreasing over
time in early periods, as demonstrated in Figure 3. As competition matures,
the incumbent’s pro…ts decline and this is only partially o¤set by the increase
of the entrant’s pro…ts so that producer surplus is declining over time. At the
same time consumers gain from more mature competition, which is re‡ected
by the increasing trajectory of consumer surplus (see Figure 3).
In our simulations, introducing a reciprocal access markup does not sub-
stantially change the picture in terms of the slopes of the trajectories of the
variables. The only notable exception is the per-minute price which was con-
stant under cost-based regulation. Since per-minute price equals perceived
marginal costs, the entrant’s per-minute price is decreasing over time as it










Figure 3: Cost-based regulation: surplus
b u i l d su pat r a c kr e c o r do fq u a l i t y .T h er e a s o ni st h a ti th a sas m a l lm a r k e t
share in early periods leading to relatively high perceived marginal costs.
These costs are signi…cantly higher than those of the incumbent because a
call originating on the incumbent’s network is most likely to terminate on
the incumbent’s network when the incumbent’s market share is large.
Under a positive reciprocal access markup, the entrant has a lower market
share than under cost-based access pricing because of its higher perceived
marginal costs. Whether or not the entrant is doing better under reciprocal
access price regulation in a period in which it has not yet fully built up its
track record cannot be said unambiguously. Our simulations give the result
that aggregated over time it receives lower pro…ts under a reciprocal access
price markup than under cost-based regulation.19 In the long run, pro…ts are
not a¤ected by a symmetric access markup: in a symmetric market losses in
pro…ts from subscription are exactly o¤set by gains in pro…ts from incoming
calls when comparing a positive access markup to access price equal the
marginal cost of the local loop (the pro…t neutrality results in mature markets
has been pointed by La¤ont, Rey, and Tirole, 1998).
Clearly, a positive reciprocal access markup reduces welfare and con-
sumers surplus in the long run because perceived marginal costs deviate
from true marginal costs giving rise to a deadweight loss.
4.3 Asymmetric Access Price Regulation
Asymmetric access price regulation treats entrant and incumbent di¤erently.
We consider regulation which favors the entrant in early periods of competi-
19On reciprocal access price regulation in an asymmetric market see De Bijl and Peitz
(2000, Chapters 3 and 4), De Bijl and Peitz (2001) and Carter and Wright (2001).











Figure 4: Asymmetric access price regulation: subscription fees
tion by …xing an access price above marginal costs for calls terminating on
the entrant’s network. In our simulations reported here, this access markup
prevails for six periods. The incumbent and, in later periods, also the entrant,
are subject to cost-based regulation. This asymmetric regulation generates
positive pro…ts from incoming calls for the entrant.
While building up its track record the entrant gains market share so that
it becomes more likely over time that a consumer who is subscribed to the
incumbent’s network makes an o¤-net call. Hence, under our asymmetric
regulatory regime the incumbent’s perceived marginal costs are increasing
over time as long as the entrant is allowed to charge a …xed access markup
(see Figure 5); the incumbent sets a higher per-minute price than under
cost-based regulation. The more aggressive behavior of the entrant can be
explained as follows: an additional consumer not only generates pro…ts for
the entrant through its subscription but also generates additional incoming
calls, which are valuable to the entrant. It turns out that under mutual
best replies both operators price more aggressively than under reciprocal
access price regulation.20 For early periods, in which the per-minute price
of the incumbent does not di¤er much between cost-based and asymmetric
regulation (this can be seen by comparing Figure 4 with Figure 1).
The di¤erence between true and perceived marginal costs is quite small
initially due to the small market share of the entrant (so that the analysis
of Section 3 comes quite close to what is observed in our simulation results).
Nevertheless, competition is strongly a¤ected because the entrant gains from
incoming tra¢c. In our simulation, the evolution of market share is only
slightly better for the entrant under asymmetric regulation than under cost-
20This result appears to be robust in our simulations. It would be desirable to have this
as a general (analytical) result, as in Section 3.
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Figure 5: Asymmetric access price regulation: per minute prices
based regulation (they do not change in the version of Section 3) but its
pro…ts in early periods are much larger in relative terms.
To facilitate the comparison between cost-based and asymmetric access
price regulation we present in Tables 2 and 3 pro…ts and consumer surplus for
t h epe r i od1a n dpe r i od6 .N o t et h a tt h er e s u l t si nt h e… r s ta n ds e c o n dc o l u m n
are analytical results that correspond to cost-based regulation and asymmet-
ric access price regulation such that the incumbent’s per-minute price is …xed
to true marginal costs (see Section 3). The third column is derived from sim-
ulations. Numbers show that asymmetric access price regulation is e¤ective








price regulation with ‡exible
per-minute prices
¼1
1 1680.56 1428.47 1429.04
¼1
2 13.89 15.97 15.97
CS1 7073.61 7323.62 7323.01
W 1 8768.06 8768.06 8768.02
Table 2: Pro…ts and surplus in period 1 – cost-based versus asymmetric
access price regulation



















price regulation with ‡exible
per-minute prices
¼6
1 1003.47 852.95 854.03
¼6
2 170.14 195.66 195.53
CS6 7568.40 7693.40 7692.15
W 6 8742.01 8742.01 8741.71
Table 3: Pro…ts and surplus in period 6 – cost-based versus asymmetric
access price regulation
Trajectories of pro…ts under asymmetric regulation are depicted in Figure
6. Using our parameter constellation, pro…ts in period 1 are 16 instead of 14
million Euros and, in period 6, they are 196 instead of 170 million Euros (see
Tables 2 and 3). This makes asymmetric access price regulation a powerful
instrument to improve the entrant’s pro…ts in early periods. Entrants whose
fate depends on short-run pro…t evaluations of …nancial markets may need
such an initial regulatory stimulus to become or remain active in the market.
More intense competition in early periods works in favor of consumers
so that consumers surplus is higher under asymmetric regulation than under
cost-based regulation. Welfare is lower for two reasons: …rst, a small number
of consumers subscribe to the entrant’s network who would have subscribed
to the incumbent under cost-based regulation. Due to the initial lack of
the entrant’s track record this constitutes a loss in social surplus. Second,
the deviation of the incumbent’s per-minute price from true marginal costs
creates a deadweight loss. Both these e¤ects are rather negligible in our
simulation. (In our analysis with …xed per-minute prices, regulation was
neutral to welfare and purely redistributive.)
19Comparing our analysis in this section to the one in the previous section,
Tables 2 and 3 suggest that the analysis of Section 3 is a helpful approxima-
tion of the results obtained by simulation (see Peitz, 2001). We observe that
the distortionary e¤ect due to higher per-minute prices is small. Net utili-
ties of consumers and market shares are hardly a¤ected, although there is a
signi…cant e¤ect on the incumbent’s retail prices: for instance, in period 6,
the incumbent’s subscription fee is approximately 44 Euros when per-minute
price is ‡exible whereas it is approximately 46 Euros when per-minute price
is …xed at true marginal costs.
4.4 Price Cap Regulation
If the incumbent is subject to price cap regulation that includes a restric-
tion on its subscription fee, the price cap is likely to be binding in early
periods when the incumbent still enjoys substantial market power. In these
periods the forces of competition may be insu¢cient from the viewpoint of
the regulatory authority to guarantee “reasonable” prices for consumers. We
remark that price cap regulation that achieves this goal does not need to be
phased out; it automatically becomes obsolete as competition matures, that
is, as competitors gain strength. So it can remain in place without in‡icting
any harm. We consider a price cap that is only applied to retail prices; the
wholesale price (that is the access price) is separately regulated.
Concerning retail prices the regulator may have di¤erent concerns. To
eliminate a deadweight loss he may force the incumbent to set its per-minute
price equal to true marginal costs (see Section 3). To avoid that consumers
have to pay an “excessive” subscription fee he may separately impose a maxi-
mal retail price. Only one of these two prices may be …xed or both of them.21
As in De Bijl and Peitz (2001), we only consider a price cap on sub-
scription fees (for more on price cap regulation see De Bijl and Peitz, 2000,
Chapters 3 and 4). This re‡ects the importance that a regulator may attach
to universal service provision, which is typically embodied in a low sub-
scription fee. For example in the Netherlands, telecommunications authority
Opta has made sure that the former incumbent KPN Telecom o¤ers a budget
subscription (among other contracts). The aim of this contract is that every
customer is able to be connected, can be reached, and can make phone calls if
needed, although the per-minute price is usually higher for budget contracts.
Consider a price cap on subscription fees together with asymmetric ac-
cess price regulation. We comment on results obtained from simulations for
21The regulator may alternatively impose a joint retail price cap so as to make a con-
nection together with a certain number of call minutes available at a certain price.










Figure 7: Price cap regulation: subscription fees
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Figure 8: Price cap regulation: per minute prices
asymmetric access price regulation in place for 9 periods.22 As argued above,
a subscription fee is binding in those periods in which the incumbent enjoys
a considerable degree of market power, as can be seen in Figure 7. Because
the incumbent is not restricted in its per-minute price, it increases the per-
minute price above perceived marginal costs in those periods in which the
price cap is binding for the subscription fee. As time passes, the market
power of the incumbent declines; this implies that the shadow price on the
price cap restriction decreases and the per-minute price decreases, ceteris
paribus. This tendency of a lower per-minute price is only partially o¤set by
an increase in perceived marginal costs (see Figure 8).
The per-minute price is an imperfect instrument for the incumbent to
make pro…ts compared to the subscription fee. In equilibrium, both operators
22A more detailed analysis of simulations is found in De Bijl and Peitz (2001). Some
numbers have to be rescaled to account for di¤erences in market size.
21make lower pro…ts than in the absence of price cap regulation because the
incumbent prices more aggressively. Consumers on the other hand gain from
price cap regulation.
Compared to cost-based regulation, the entrant may do better than under
combined price cap and asymmetric access price regulation. This is not
necessarily so: a tough price cap regime may even in‡ict losses on the entrant
so that it may refrain from entering in the …rst place. This makes price cap
regulation a di¢cult policy instrument because one has to balance consumer
interests with the goal of stimulating entry. Furthermore, price cap regulation
such as pure subscription fee regulation can lead to strong distortions in the
incumbent’s pricing structure away from true marginal costs, and such pricing
leads to a welfare loss.
The e¤ect of price cap regulation on the per-minute price can be avoided
if the incumbent’s per-minute price is regulated separately. Under such a
more intrusive regulation the regulator can …x the incumbent’s per-minute
price at its socially e¢cient level, that is, at true marginal costs. A binding
price cap on the subscription fee then makes the incumbent compete more
aggressively than under cost-based regulation (as well as under regulation
that only …xes the subscription fee). This a¤ects the entrant’s pro…ts nega-
tively. A temporary access markup for the entrant generates positive pro…ts
from incoming calls thus enabling the entrant to approach or reach pro…t
levels that would be realized under cost-based regulation.
To summarize, also when imposing separate price caps on both retail
prices of the incumbent, the regulator can ameliorate the prospects of the
entrant by complementing the price cap with asymmetric access price regu-
lation.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has explored the role of regulation in an asymmetric market.
First, consider wholesale price regulation. In early periods after liberaliza-
tion the entrant is at a disadvantage (because of lower …xed utility). We have
shown that, in early periods, asymmetric access price regulation that gives a
positive access markup to the entrant and is cost-based for the incumbent is
an e¤ective instrument to increase consumer surplus and to enhance pro…ts
of the entrant. An access markup for the entrant makes entry more attrac-
tive and, given entry, increases competition. Once an entrant has gained
competitive strength so that, under symmetric regulation, it competes more
or less on equal terms with the incumbent, asymmetric regulation should
22be replaced by cost-based regulation if regulation is not abolished.23 This
conclusion is consistent with the general objectives and principles on e¤ec-
tive competition spelled out by the British regulator Oftel (see Oftel, 2000,
Appendix I).
Regulatory pricing principle for the wholesale market: In early
periods after liberalization the regulator should set asymmetric access
prices such that only the entrant enjoys an access markup. This has
two positive e¤ects on competition: a potential entrant is more likely
to enter and, given entry, competition is more intense. In later periods
access price regulation should be cost-based. This type of wholesale price
regulation is e¤ective in protecting consumers and encouraging entry at
the same time; welfare losses are likely to be small.
Even under such asymmetric wholesale price regulation the incumbent
may enjoy substantial market power so that the regulator may want to inter-
vene in the retail market directly to protect consumers. A price cap on the
incumbent’s subscription fee serves the goal to make a connection available to
all consumers at an “a¤ordable” price. Note, however, that such regulation
leads to lower pro…ts of the entrant so that the goal to protect consumers in
the short run has to be carefully weighed against the goal to encourage entry
(see also Chapters 3 and 4 in De Bijl and Peitz, 2000). Also, the deadweight
loss from distorted per-minute prices may be substantial.
Regulatory pricing principle for the retail market: Ap r i c ec a po n
the incumbent’s subscription fee leads to “a¤ordable” subscriptions for
all consumers. Pro…ts of both operators su¤er so that entry becomes
more di¢cult. This type of retail price regulation is e¤ective in pro-
tecting consumers but it may discourage entry. Welfare losses can be
substantial.
We brie‡y discuss two further issues related to asymmetric regulation that
have not been addressed in our analysis. These considerations are important
for the application of asymmetric regulation.
In our analysis, regulatory policy did not depend on market outcomes.
Owing to the initial uncertainty on the side of the regulator how the market
will evolve, it seems problematic to implement a policy in practice that does
not depend on realized market outcomes. On the other hand, if the replace-
ment of asymmetric by reciprocal access price regulation depends on market
23Regulation is not needed in our model in the long run if in the absence of regulation,
operators negotiate the reciprocal access price. In this case they choose access price equal
to marginal costs in our model.
23outcomes, operators can strategically exploit the endogeneity of regulatory
variables by taking into account the e¤ect of their decisions on the relevant
market outcomes. This may be harmful for competition. For instance, a
market share-based criterion gives incentives to incumbents and entrants to
behave less aggressively: the incumbent prefers a rapid replacement of asym-
metric regulation and the entrant the opposite. Both operators thus have an
incentive to raise their subscription fees.
In our analysis, we also postulated that in the long run both operators
are equally e¢cient. If some of the asymmetries between operators are time-
persistent, the regulator has to worry about ine¢cient entry. Note that even
under cost-based regulation operators with di¤erent cost levels can both enjoy
positive pro…ts in an oligopolistic market in which price-cost margins are not
competed away. When applying asymmetric instead of cost-based access
price regulation and thus providing a temporary advantage for entrants, the
regulator must keep in mind that this may attract less e¢cient entrants.
24Appendix: Parameter Constellation
We spell out our parameter con…guration in the following list.









cost parameters c11 = c21 2 Euro-cents
c12 = c22 1.5 Euro-cents
c13 = c23 0.5 Euro-cents
f1 = f2 20 Euros
The regulatory regimes are as follows: under cost-based regulation, the
(reciprocal) access price is set equal to 0.5 Euro-cents in all periods. For
the reciprocal access markup we set the access price equal to 1 in all pe-
riods. Asymmetric access price regulation is invoked for a limited number
of periods and replaced afterwards by cost-based regulation. We consider
asymmetric access prices for six and for nine periods. In the former case we
speak of short-lived asymmetric regulation, in the latter of long-lived asym-
metric regulation. In the moderately asymmetric regime the price to access
the entrant’s network is 1 Euro-cent, whereas in the strongly asymmetric
regime the price to access the entrant’s network is 2 Euro-cents. Under price
cap regulation we consider moderately asymmetric access prices and a price
cap on the incumbent’s subscription fee of 45 Euros per period.
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